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DECEMBER 1970	 NUMBER 2
HARPOONING WHALES, OF WHICH KARL N.
LLEWELLYN IS THE HERO OF THE PIECE;
OR SEARCHING FOR MORE EXPANSION JOINTS
IN KARL'S CRUMBLING CATHEDRAL*
DAVID W. CARROLL**
To The Courts: [You] must . . . take the music of any statute
as written by the legislature; [you]must take the text of the
play as written by the legislature. But there are many ways to
play that music, to play that play, and [your]duty is to play
it well, and in harmony with the other music of the legal
system.'
Although it has been effective in many states for only a few years,
the Uniform Commercial Code' (U.C.C.) is being attacked with in-
creasing frequency. Charges are made of bias against consumers and
of favoritism toward merchants,' and angry rhetoric often erupts in
classrooms from new law students, highly sensitive to the injustice
and business bias they perceive in the Code.' Indeed, the official de-
* As to whales, see Chen v. Rich, 8 F. 159 (D. Mass. 1881), discussed infra. As to
cathedrals, see the extended metaphor in Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beauti-
ful, in Law, 9 U. Chi. L. Rev, 224, 230-34 (1942),
** B.S., Ohio State University, 1953; J.D., Ohio State University, 1954; Professor of
Law, Boston College Law School.
1 Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vend. L. Rev. 395, 399 (1950), citing
Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 Colum. L.
Rev. 1259 (1947).
2 All citations to the Uniform Commercial Code in this article will be to the 1962
Official Text unless otherwise indicated.
Childres & Garamella, The Law of Restitution and the Reliance Interest in Con-
tract, 64 Nw, U.L. Rev. 433, 442 (1969).
4 Typical of Code provisions which evoke such reactions are {§ 3-302 and 3.305
139
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
scription of the informal consultants who advised the draftsman of
the Code would discourage the most sanguine consumer advocate:
In this latter class were included practicing lawyers, hard-
headed businessmen and operating bankers, who contributed
generously of their time and knowledge so that, not only cur-
rent business practice, but foreseeable future developments
would be covered.'
General assertions to the effect that the Uniform Commercial Code
was an experiment in democracy in legislative drafting apparently
ignore the fact that the drafters comprised a virtually homogeneous
"democratic group" of businessmen, bankers and their lawyers.° Gil-
more's commentary concerning the drafting history of Article Nine
(including the elimination of the chapter on Consumer Financing from
the final draft), recounts that discussions of possible consumer pro-
tection provisions "led to violent controversy," 7 and that ultimately
the Commissioners decided to take no position on consumer protec-
tion,8
 thus leaving this entire area of regulation to the courts and the
legislatures of the various states.
Taking no position on these questions, however, involved, in actu-
ality, taking a quite definite position adverse to consumer interests.
which set forth the "holder in due course" doctrine, often invoked to preclude consumer
defenses arising out of a transaction which gives rise to a negotiable instrument. Others
include § 2-718(2) (b), which, in the absence of a contrary agreement, limits restitution
of a defaulting buyer's equity in goods being purchased to 20% of the "value of total
performance for which the buyer is obligated under the contract or $500, whichever is
smaller," irrespective of whether the seller has actually been damaged to this extent. An-
other example is the inconsistency between § 9-302(1)(d), which permits perfection of
a purchase money security interest in consumer goods without the necessity of filing a
financing statement, apparently on the theory that no one ever checks to see whether
a financing statement has been filed, and I 9-307(2), which declares that a security in-
terest in consumer goods is valid against a good faith purchaser of the goods so long as a
financing statement has been filed, despite the tacit recognition in § 9-301(1)(d) that
such financing statements afford no genuine "notice" in cases involving consumer goods.
Still another example is § 9-206(1), which embodies a general approval of a contract
clause waiving the buyer's defenses against assignees of the contract, and creates an
implied-in-law waiver of defenses against assignees in transactions in which the buyer
signs a negotiable note and a security agreement. This provision also expressly relegates
the problem of improving the Iot of consumers to the courts and legislatures. For a re-
vealing discussion of the drafting history of the Secured Transactions Article of the
Code (Article 9) and the ultimate abandonment of attempts to regulate consumer trans-
actions, see Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Uniform Commercial Code,
16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 27, 44-48 (1951).
5 Introductory Comment to the U.C.C. 9.
8 See generally Mentschikoff, The Uniform Commercial Code; An Experiment in
Democracy in Drafting, 36 A.B.A.J. 419 (1950).
7 Gilmore, The Assignee of Contract Rights and His Precarious Security, 74 Yale
L.J. 217, 232 (1964).
8 1, G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 9.2, at 293-94 (1965).
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This non-action,, for example, afforded financial institutions ease and
simplicity in perfecting security interests in consumer goods;° it ren-
dered holders in due course of consumer paper immune to most of the
legitimate defenses which might be raised by consumer-buyers; 10 it
permitted inclusion in consumer contracts of blanket waivers of de-
fenses against assignees;" and it generally left the consumer-buyer
subject to a host of other provisions substantially weighted in favor of
business interests. The inclusion of such provisions in the Code, while
simultaneously relegating consumer problems to the piecemeal proc-
esses of the courts and ' legislatures, belies any assertion that the
drafters of the Code took no position on the question of consumer
protection. In addition, this assertion disregards the practical realities
of the state legislative process, in which banking and business interests
generally possess a disproportionate amount of power. Given the ad-
ditional fact that in some state legislatures even the tattered remnants
of consumer protection which managed to survive the drafting process
were either curbed or stricken,' it is not surprising that consumer
groups and advocates criticize the Code, tend to ignore it, and rush
to the legislatures with proposals to reform it."
The purpose of this article, therefore, will be to evaluate this
criticism; to examine Karl N. Llewellyn's legal philosophy for guid-
ance in interpreting the U.C.C.; to suggest additional provisions in the
U.C.C. which may provide for flexibility of legal development and
the implementation of consumer-interest values; to urge the effective-
ness of the common law, the U.C.C. and the case system in effectu-
ating a more favorable business-consumer balance; and to make some
9 U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (d). See the discussion in note 4 supra.
10 U.C.C. §§ 3-302 and 3-305. See the discussion in note 4 supra.
11 U.C.C. § 9-206(1). See the discussion in note 4 supra.
12 See, e.g., the California and North Carolina versions of the U.C.C., which elim-
inated § 2-302 (the "unconscionability" provision) in its entirety. 1 W. Willier & F.
Hart, U.C.C. Reporter-Digest § 3-302, at 1-77 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Willier &
Hart]. Also, the version of § 9-307 enacted in California omits subsection 2 of the
Official Text, relating to the protection of buyers of consumer goods which are subject
to a pre-existing security interest. Willier & Hart, § 9-307 at 1-751.
13 Examples of such proposals attempting in varying degree to "reform" various
provisions of the U.C.C. include the ,Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-677 (Supp. IV, 1969) ; the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, recently promulgated
by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and adopted in Oklahoma, as Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 14A, §§ 1-101 to 9-103 (Supp. 1969),.and in Utah, as Utah Code Ann. tit. 70B,
§§ 1-101 to 9-103 (Stipp. 1969); the comprehensive National Consumer Act, drafted by
the National Consumer Law Center at Boston College Law School; and bills currently
pending in Congress which would give consumers the right to bring class actions for the
redress of illegal or unscrupulous business practices, e.g., S. 3092 and companion bill
H.R. 14,585, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), as well as bills intended to regulate warranties
on goods sold in interstate commerce, e.g., S. 3074 and H.R. 18,758, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970).
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specific suggestions concerning section 1-205, regarding trade usage
and customary commercial law.
I. SOME COMMENTS AND DISCUSSION CONCERNING THE LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY OF KARL N. LLEWELLYN 14
A. A Hypothetical Reconstruction of the Evolution of the U.C.C.
Our law teaching has gained breadth and depth from the
employment of full time teachers who have had time to work
out systematic synthesis on a larger scale than is commonly
possible for the judge or the practitioner. To this development
we owe perspective in legal doctrine. For it, we have paid a
price, increasingly heavy, of academic abstraction and remote-
ness from life.15
Legal literature currently contains discussions of the substantive
content of virtually every section of the Uniform Commercial Code.
However, a general discussion of the legal philosophy underlying the
Code would seem to be warranted. Karl Llewellyn, as the Code's chief
architect, more than any other person provided the broad legal per-
spective which resulted in the U.C.C. "Karl Llewellyn watching" is
thus becoming an increasingly popular method of U.C.C. interpre-
tation.'a
It is a possible, albeit depressing, hypothesis that in the above-
quoted excerpt from the Introduction to his 1930 casebook on Sales, Karl
Llewellyn prophesied his own future failure regarding the Uniform
Commercial Code. Since an evaluation and analysis of this hypothesis
will serve as the structure for the succeeding consideration of some of
Karl Llewellyn's views, and also as the basis for some suggestions
regarding a possible interpretation of Section 1-205 of the U.C.C., it
will be useful to set forth this hypothesis in detail:
In 1949 a group of naive academics completed a draft of a proposed
Uniform Commercial Code in which they attempted to propose direct
legislation which would result in a proper economic and social balance
between mercantile and consumer interests. It might even be suggested
that the professors did not thoroughly consider consumer or societal
interests, but merely copied provisions of existing consumer legisla-
24 The following discussion surveys only limited aspects of Llewellyn's legal philos-
ophy. Hopefully, a forthcoming volume entitled "The Karl Llewellyn Papers," will reveal
much more on this subject. See the reference to this forthcoming work in Twining,
Pericles and the Plumber, 83 L.Q. Rev. 396, 411 n.35 (1967).
15 K. Llewellyn, Cases and Materials on the Law of Sales ix (1930).
la See, e.g., Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1
(1969), and Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1967). Both authors cite Llewellyn's works extensively.
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tion." No consideration was given to the relative strength, organi-
zation, or political effectiveness of any of the special interest groups
which would be directly affected by the proposed Code. Then the
Code obtained "influential friends"—the business and financial in-
terests—who succeeded in completely out-negotiating the professors.
These "hard-headed" business types proceeded in subsequent drafts
to eliminate all general provisions imbuing the Code with principles
of justice and business morality, and to delete most of the specific sec-
tions providing protection or relief to the consumer. The "remote-
from-life" professors were not equipped to negotiate with experienced
legal practitioners, were awed by their "practice mystique,"" and
were persuaded by such academic abstractions as the conception that
no position should be taken on social matters because they could
better be considered separately, or the notion that providing business-
men and lenders with certainty and simplicity of obtaining legal rights
would utimately result in lower costs to the consumer. The possibility
that the Code would worsen the existing legal balance did not come to
mind, and no one thought of the possibility that if the business and
financial interests obtained all of the legislative changes that they
desired, it would be more difficult to bargain with them for subse-
quent legislative concessions benefitting consumers. The professors
were duped into lending an air of legitimacy to what was in effect a
piece of special interest legislation. The public was misled by the
belief that legal scholars would not lend support to unfair legislation.
Finally, the business and banking lobbies were able in some states to
eliminate most of whatever remnants of consumer protection pro-
visions survived the drafting process." The result was a relatively
rigid, legalistic, pro-business commerical code.
B. Llewellyn's Legal Philosophy
Three aspects of Karl Llewellyn's thinking should be emphasized
in evaluating the foregoing hypothesis concerning the development and
content of the U.C.C.:
17 See generally Article 7, pt. 6 (Consumer's Goods Financing) of the May 1949
Draft of the U.C.C. Perusal of the various comments to this subpart, which was later
deleted, indicate that most of its provisions were adopted from pre-existing practices or
statutory provisions.
15 Llewellyn himself occasionally evidenced a tendency to be overly-impressed with
practitioners. See, e.g., Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About flow Statutes Arc to Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 396-97
(1950); Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 779, 784 (1953):
I may say that nowhere Lin the course of drafting the U.C.C.] did we receive
finer, more constructive and suggestive criticisms than from the bar associations.
See note 12 supra.
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1. He was aware of the danger of law teachers becoming remote
from the realities of life. 20
2. He foresaw and favored the economic and legal trends which
would increasingly benefit consumer and societal values as
opposed to the interests of the business and financial com-
munity.2I
3. He studied and considered not only the pressures exerted by
sub-groups to obtain selfish ends through the law, but also the
need to counter these pressures in order to further the welfare
of the entire society. 22
The counter-pressure mentioned in point three would have to be ex-
erted by persons concerned about the common weal, and it seems
reasonable to assume that he viewed himself in this role. More spe-
cifically, he was acutely sensitive to the tremendous influence of the
business and financial sub-groups throughout the legal system, and
seemed to favor a reduction of this influence.23 Llewellyn himself
summarized his legal philosophy as follows:
My faith is a different faith. I proceed upon the assumption
that clear seeing and clear statement, to the extent to which
it can be achieved, is a long-range greater gain. I bold the
hard authority-aspect of the legal imperative, and the hard
regularity-aspect, to be worth isolating for work and note,
that they may be seen sharply as Not Enough for any decent
system to rest content with. I deny, flat, any inherent ten-
dency of hard seeing to drown the drive for the good and for
the better. I hold the responsibility for working toward the
Right and the Just within the hard legal frame to be better
pinned on the official if it becomes common knowledge that
to be Legal is not enough. I hold the jurists' job to remain
undone until we can discover and make clear how far our
officials can be controlled, and bow far not, and, until we
then.devise means to control them effectively where they can
be controlled, to be to give them some guidance in the remain-
ing area, and to help them distinguish the arbitrary from the
20 See quotation on p. 142 supra.
21 See Llewellyn, On Law and Our Commerce, 1949 Wis. L. Rev. 625, 631-33
(1949) ; Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. Chi. L. Rev. 224,
254-58 (1942).
22 Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal; and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic
Method, 49 Yale L.J. 1355, 1362-363, 1382-383, 1388-389 (1940).
23 Llewellyn, On Philosophy in American Law, 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 205, 208-09
(1934) ; Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. Chi. L. Rev.
224, 264 (1942).
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wise. The most fruitful angle of approach to accomplishing
this task which I can see, is to defuse and deconfuse the
merely authoritative, the merely regular, the merely inci-
dental to the accepted System, from the Just or Right, and to
get into spotlighted pillory so much of Law as has no busi-
ness to be Law, so much of the Legal as should be made
Unlawful, so much of Jumble as should be made into clear,
guidesome Leads. . . . I hold the dulling of conscience and
ideals among too many men of law to be a result not of hard-
ening of the eye, but, in good part, of a confused tradition that
if it is Legal, it is there f ore Right enough."
This statement provides some insight into the type of codification of
a general area of law which Llewellyn would favor and, at the same
time, serves as a reminder of the complexity of the man. It also points
up the difficulty of summarizing his views on justice, the common
law system and codification. His apparent approval of strict legal
rules, and the view that these legal rules may be in substantial con-
flict with the ethical and moral values of the society to which they
relate is the one aspect of Llewellyn's writing which is the most dif-
ficult to explain and reconcile with his other views. He termed him-
self a legal realist." To him, the identifying characteristics of a legal
realist were an ability, for the purpose of temporary study, to separate
what the legal system was actually doing from what the system ought
to be doing; a distrust for the theory that traditional legal rules are
the heavily operative factor in producing court decisions; a belief in
more narrow categories of cases for study and analysis; an insistence
upon finding and evaluating the effects of any part of the law; and a
penchant for the sustained and programmatic study of law." Llewel-
lyn strongly denied, however, that legal realists were not interested
in justice." He particularly denied that commercial law realists were
interested more in the business aspects of the law, for business pur-
poses, than in the values of society as a whole." Justice, in Llewellyn's
view, would be obtained through a smoothly operating, economical,
efficient and accurate fact-finding legal system, which would consis-
tently provide the most balanced result for the welfare of all the people
24 Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-jobs: The Problem of Juristic
Method, 49 Yale L.J. 1355, 1372-313 (1940).
22 Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 Harv.
L. Rev. 1222 n.* (1931).
26 Id. at 1236-238.
27 Id. at 1231.
28 Id. at 1231-232, 1261-262.
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in a constantly evolving society," and in the area of commercial law,
justice would result from the growing tendency of the courts to exer-
cise equitable control over transactions involving parties of unequal
bargaining power. 8°
C. Llewellyn's Concept of the "Sociology" of Law
Llewellyn's views on the "sociology" of law" and his conclusions
deriving from his observation of primitive legal systems, 82 are ex-
tremely important both in evaluating the hypothesis set forth above"
and in considering the proposals for interpretation of the Uniform
Commercial Code which will later be suggested. He conceived as the
basic function of the law the regulation of human interaction." Law
would develop from a regular pattern of human interaction through
various carefully defined stages of legal incipiency" until it would
finally emerge, probably in the wake of a trouble case, as a formal
legal principle." The legal imperative resulting from this process is
not necessarily equivalent to the normative, which he defined as the
correct standard in a moral and ethical sense." As a result of the need
he felt to classify carefully the various stages of legal incipiency, and
to separate the legal from the normative for purposes of analysis, he
rejected the use of the term "custom" as being too blunt and con-
fused to serve in careful analysis." This rejection should not be taken
to suggest, however, that he did not believe that the emergence of legal
rules in a customary law system was highly relevant to the structuring
of a modern legal system. He expressly stated the contrary," and his
views on the common law system reflect a strong customary law
flavor."
Llewellyn believed the law served the function of channeling hu-
28 See Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. Chi. L. Rev. 224,
254-55 (1942), and the quotation excerpted on pp. 144-45 supra.
8° Llewellyn, The Modern Approach to Counselling and Advocacy—Especially In
Commercial Transactions, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 167, 177-78 (1946).
81 Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of juristic
Method, 49 Vale L.j. 1355, 1355-356 (1940).
82 See generally K. Llewellyn and E. Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way (1941), which
details Llewellyn's studies of the legal system evolved by the Cheyenne Indians.
88 See pp. 142-43 supra.
84 K. Llewellyn & E. Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way 20 (1941).
85 Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-jobs: The Problem of juristic
Method, 49 Vale L.J. 1355, 1358 (1940).
BO Id. at 1360-361.
217
 Id. at 1359.
88 Id. at 1359 n.l.
BO Id. at 1378-379.
40 See generally Llewellyn, the Modern Approach to Counselling and Advocacy—
Especially in Commercial Transactions, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 167 (1946).
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man behavior, and therefore, the law had to be flexible enough to
accommodate itself to shifting societal concepts of justice. 41 In order to
accomplish the channeling and re-channeling functions reasonably,
while maintaining the flexibility necessary to react to societal reorien-
tation, Llewellyn emphasized the need to develop regularity of pattern
through several legal incipiency stages before a new practice or pattern
became law:
The degree of regularity needed is: enough to be perceived,
so that it can be adjusted to—so that it can both found ex-
pectations and lay a basis for their recognition: call it going
expectations:12 (Emphasis in original.)
The exact limits and scope of the new legal pattern or practice could
thereafter be refined on a case-by-case basis. Llewellyn describes this
process of evolution and refinement of legal principles in the follow-
ing passage which outlines what will be designated, for purposes of
this article, as his "purpose-line theory":
In view, moreover, of the tendency of the concept "rule" to
suggest some definiteness and fixity, we shall do well to recall
that much useful charting of travel can be clone by way of
indicating merely direction, across a country whose boun-
daries and even detailed landscape may still be blind to us. If
the lines of proper cleavage be moderately clear, detail can
then be accumulated as we go, and mistaken judgment on
detail (as in the case of principle) can then be left behind.
But for a rule or concept to take more definite shape, or to
expand, intelligently and intelligibly, the care of purpose
must be clear—and must be just to the situation. Out of the
root of this purpose-line of significance, the other—that of
what facts call the rule into application—can be left to grow
and change; this, as I understand it, is what is being said by
those who urge that case-law depends on Principle."
Llewellyn, therefore, would obviously attempt to incorporate this
"regularity of pattern" concept in the commercial code. He was
acutely aware of rapid movement and change in society, and he be-
lieved that the law had to adjust to and provide for this change. He
assumed that most societies would tolerate a reasonably wide gulf
41 Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic
Method, 49 Yale L.J. 1355, 1376-383 (1940).
42 Id, at 1368.
48 Llewellyn, On Our Case Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, I., 48 Yale L.J.
1, 31 (1938).
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between their current concepts of justice and their laws, but that
well-selected legal officials in an efficient legal system would constantly
be moving the law closer to the society's view of justice." He did not
propose carefully defined tests for measuring the permissible degree
of elasticity between law and justice in a society, but it seems reason-
able to suggest that Llewellyn would have found that the loss of trust
and confidence in American legal institutions between 1940 and 1970
substantially narrowed the permissible dichotomy. His great confi-
dence in the common law judicial system led him to believe that one
of the most effective ways in which the differences between law and
justice could be eliminated or reduced was through judicial "rekilter-
ing" of the law on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, he postulated
blocs of "Net Drive"45 which brought into the law ethical and moral
concepts which hopefully would force the law to look to the long-
term welfare of the entire society. Although he believed that substan-
tial gulfs between law and justice could exist, he saw his own role and
that of the entire legal system as being to reduce, and, if possible, to
eliminate these differences, while simultaneously allowing for changing
societal concepts of justice."
D. Llewellyn's Views on the Common Law System
Llewellyn was a student of the common law system. As such, he
was particularly interested in understanding the real reasons for ap-
pellate court decisions, and he perceived historical trends in the ap-
pellate decisional process:
In 1820-1850 our courts felt in general a freedom and duty
to move in the manner typified in our thought by Mansfield
and Marshall. "Precedent" guided, but "principle" con-
trolled; and nothing was good "Principle" which did not
look like wisdom-in-result for the welfare of All-of-us. In
1890-1910, on the other hand, our courts felt in general a
prime duty to order within the law and a duty to resist any
"outside" influence. "Precedent" was to control, not merely
to guide; "Principle" was to be tested by whether it made
for order in the law, not by whether it made wisdom-in-
result. "Legal" Principle could not be subjected to "political"
tests; even legislation was resisted as disturbing. Since 1920 the
earlier style (the "Grand Style") has been working its way
44 See Llewellyn, The Modern Approach to Counselling and Advocacy—Especially
in Commercial Transactions, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 167, 177-78 (1946).
46 Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic
Method, 49 Yale L.J. 1355, 1387-395 (1940).
40 See quotation on pp. 144-45 supra.
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back into general use by our courts, though the language
of the opinions moves still dominantly (though waningly)
in the style (the "Formal Style") of the late 19th Century. 41
Llewellyn obviously favored the justice-seeking, principle-oriented
style, and believed that the law had to be simple, readily available,
and widely understood so that society could develop the wise and
capable judges necessary for the "Grand Style" to function properly.
He had a strong and abiding faith in the common law system and in
the principle that, in a particular case, the "just" decision would
usually be reached. He doubted, however, that strict legal rules had
much effect on the outcome of most cases. He was intrigued by the
"fact" content of many common law legal terms and felt that an ex-
amination of fact patterns provided more insight into the operation
of the common law system than the passages of opinions which set
forth the law." It delighted him to take a single day's opinions from a
state appellate court and to point out the variety of rules of construc-
tion employed by the court and the lack of pattern or explanation for
the court's use of precedent." Nonetheless, he consistently main-
tained his confidence in the societal effectiveness of the common law
system applied to individual cases, and this attitude formed the nucleus
of his legal philosophy.
E. Llewellyn on Uniform Legislation
Llewellyn favored uniform, flexible, clear and long-lived com-
mercial legislation for the United States." Discussing the proposed
Federal Sales Act, he observed:
A codificatory Act covering a large body of private law must
not be treated as ordinary legislation. It is not ordinary legis-
lation. It is not legislation capable of easy or frequent amend-
ment; errors in it, if any, are rather to be suffered than
amended, over very considerable periods. Such a codificatory
47 Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 396 (1950).
48 Llewellyn, On Our Case Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, I., 48 Yale L.J.
1, 29 (1938).
49 Llewellyn, Speech On the Status of the Rule of Judicial Precedent, reprinted in
14 U. Cinn. L.• Rev. 208-17 (1940) ; Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand. L.
Rev. 395, 396 (1950).
BO See generally Llewellyn, The Needed Federal Sales Act, 26 Va. L. Rev. 558
(1940) ; Llewellyn, On the Good, the True; the Bautiful, in Law, 9 U. Chi. L. Rev.
224 (1942) ; Llewellyn, Problems of Codifying Security Law, 13 Law & Contemp. Prob.
687 (1948); Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 779 (1953) ;
Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 Fla. L. Rev. 367 (1957).
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Act is in a peculiar sense permanent legislation; it enters into
the commercial structure of the country. . . [It is] legisla-
tion which is declaratory of principle, which is in essence
and intent the laying down of rules to be developed by the
courts as common law rules are themselves developed by the
courts, and molded to the succession of unforeseen circum-
stances...."
We may safely conclude that Llewellyn's goals of Code clarity,
simplicity and accessibility were not achieved. Major revisions and
amendments have resulted in ambiguities and inconsistencies in lan-
guage. It is an understatement to suggest that the Code is not artfully
drawn, and it seems reasonable to suggest that courts should either
avoid or approach with great caution interpretations based upon tech-
nical grammatical constructions. Llewellyn's dream of a single small
volume replacing a large law library was also crushed in the early
drafts of the U.C.C. Related legislative enactments such as retail in-
stallment sales acts, small loan acts and motor vehicle certificate of
title laws were not integrated into the Code but were left on the books.
This resulted in both non-uniformity and a plethora of other prob-
lems. Furthermore, the apparent failure of the Code to respond to
"social legislation" problems has resulted in a mass of collateral legis-
lation and legislative proposals which directly apply to Code-type
questions. In a relatively short period of time, a jungle of interrelated,
and often overlapping, statutes in the commercial law of many states
has reappeared. It seems apparent that the hope of drafting a simple
code which would be easily understandable and usable by lay business-
men engaged in Code-type transactions was, in the final analysis, a
myth. Apart from the need to understand non-Code legal materials
in order to apply the Code correctly, the fact remains that the Code
itself is too complex to be readily understood. It contains seemingly
endless definitional problems, and interpretation of several different
sections, sometimes located in different articles, is usually required in
order to arrive at the proper Code solution to a particular problem."
51 Llewellyn, The Needed Federal Safes Act, 26 Va. L. Rev. 558, 561-62 (1940).
es The extent of the failure to achieve simplicity and lay participation in Code use
can best be illustrated by the fact that a general evaluation of U.C.C. appellate cases
will lead one to the conclusion that attorneys very often fail to cite or argue the ap-
propriate Code provisions and courts very often either fail to recognize or intentionally
ignore the appropriate sections in their decisions. A typical case illustrating this point is
McKone v. Ralph's Wonder Market, Inc., 27 Mass. App. Dec. 159 (1963), an "exploding
bottle" case in which the plaintiff was denied recovery under 2-314 of the U.C.C. (the
implied warranty of merchantability section) on the grounds that 2-314 applied only to
the good: and not to the container. Apparently, the majority of the court failed to note
subsection (e) of 2-314 which provides that in order for the goods to be merchantable
they must be "adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may re-
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A look at Llewellyn's thinking about pre-Code uniform commer-
cial statutes may also afford some insight into the structure of the
Code and its proper interpretation. His ideas concerning changes in
the law of sales were largely formulated in the 1930's. The implemen-
tation of these ideas in Article Two resulted in the major departures in
that Article from the prior provisions of the Uniform Sales Act. He
believed that the Negotiable Instruments Law was the best of the
uniform acts. He admired its longevity, flexibility, the ease of teach-
ing it to bank employees and the pride they took in their "law."" It
seems plausible to suggest that his long-term technical expertise and
his largely mercantile experience may, perhaps, have blinded him
somewhat to the societal problems created by the negotiability con-
cept of Articles Three and Four. However, the change in the defini-
tion of "good faith"" which came about during the "businessmen's
purge" of the Code obviously had an adverse effect on the balance
he was attempting to achieve in Articles Three and Four. Llewellyn's
principal connection with personal property security statutes resulted
from his drafting of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act in 1935. This act
is principally intra-mercantile in its application and may explain in part
why Article Nine appears to be the most "out-of-balance" article with
respect to recognition of societal values.
The most difficult aspect of defining the relationship between
Llewellyn and the Code and of evaluating the hypothesis posited
earlier," stems from the fact that it is impossible to assess accurately
the degree to which Llewellyn lost control of the Code or the extent to
which his purposes were frustrated. Unfortunately, he did not write
in detail on this subject. He did emphasize the fact that the Uniform
Commercial Code was not the work of one man:
But of course, in all these matters, personal views remain
personal. The staff and the controlling organizations go their
way, sometimes persuading the individual that he is wrong,
sometimes overruling him, never controlled by him."
Some of his writings indicate that he harbored some disappointment
concerning the final draft:
quire. . . ." In any event, if lawyers and Judges encounter difficulty in using the Code, it
seems likely that laymen would have even greater problems.
58 Llewellyn, Meet Negotiable Instruments, 44 Co!um. L. Rev. 299, 300 (1944).
54 U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), -203, -103(1) (b) ; King, New Conceptualism of the Uni-
form Commercial Code: Ethics, Title and Good Faith Purchaser, 11 St. Louis L.J. 15,
22-27 (1966). See generally Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Rea-
sonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 666 (1963).
55 See pp. 142-43 supra.
56 Llewellyn, Problems of Codifying Security Law, 13 Law & Contemp, Prob. 687,
702 (1948).
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A great deal of what is wrong with it now has been put in
during the past three years in an effort to pacify the bar; but
on the whole just between ourselves, they really aren't quite
ready for the best kind of law. That is a fair statement and all
of you know it down in your own souls. You all have a hang-
over from law school; you feel that the proper way to draw a
statute is to mark it out as if it was written for dumbbell
judges whom you are trying to corral. Of course, that isn't
the way to write good law. The way to write good law is to
indicate what you want to do, and you assume within reason
that the persons the law deals with will try to be decent;
then after that, you lay down the edges to take care of the
dirty guys and try to hold them in, which means that every
statute ought to have two essential bases, one to show where
the law wants you to go, and one to show where we will put
you if you don't."
I am ashamed of it in some ways; there are so many
pieces that I could make a little better; there are so many
beautiful ideas I tried to get in that would have been good
for the law, but I was voted down. A wide body of opinion
has worked the law into some sort of compromise after debate
and after exhaustive work. However, when you compare it
with anything that there is, it is an infinite improvement."
There are upwards of a hundred material places on
which as Chief Reporter I was outvoted on a position I be-
lieved in and was fighting for. I doubt if time and thought
have brought me round on as many as one sixth of such
points; a good twenty and more still cause grief which is
acute. But it should give any person comfort in regard to the
probable wisdom even of details which he finds bothersome
to realize that such details represent, regularly, repeated
majority votes of different but highly intelligent bodies of
lawyers, after informed and sustained meditation and discus-
sion."
It is unfortunate that he was not more explicit about his dis-
appointment. In the final analysis, however, it is probably only rel-
87 Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 Tenn, L. Rev. 779, 782 (1953).
58 Id, at 784.
88 Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Comthercial Code, 10 Fla. L. Rev. 367, 374
n.2 (1957).
152
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON "USAGE OF TRADE"
evant to attempt to determine whether, from Llewellyn's standpoint,
the U.C.C. has or ever will have an overall beneficial effect on the
societal balance of the legal system. On this point, Professor Gilmore
had this to say about the effect of the revisions on Llewellyn:
It was, I believe, Karl's non-systematic, particularizing cast
of mind and his case-law orientation which gave to the stat-
utes he drafted, and particularly to the Code, their profound
originality. He was a remarkable draftsman and took a
never-failing interest in even the minutiae of the trade. His
instinct appeared to be to draft in a loose, open-ended style;
his preferred solutions turned on questions of fact (reason-
ableness, good faith, usage of trade) rather than on rules
of law. He had clearly in mind the idea of a case-law Code:
one that would furnish guidelines for a fresh start, would
accommodate itself to changing circumstances, would not so
much contain the law as free it for a new growth. The tastes
of the practicing lawyers who advised the draftsmen were,
in most cases, opposed to the flexible ideas of the Chief Re-
porter: they preferred, they insisted on, a tightly-drawn stat-
ute, precise, detailed and rigid. Among the many drafts of
the Code which appeared, beginning in 1946, the early drafts
were in many ways closer to Karl's conception of the Code
than were the final drafts. In the concluding phase of the
drafting, concessions were inevitably made to what might be
called political pressures; I do not mean to suggest that these
pressures were in any sense evil or malevolent. I have come
to feel that Karl saw more clearly than his critics and that
the Code as he initially conceived it might better have served
the purposes of the next fifty years. Yet Karl never lost
sight of the fact that his job was to produce, not the best Code
which could ideally be put together by a band of scholarly
angels, but the best Code which stood a chance of passage
in the imperfect world of man. He cheerfully gave ground
when he had to: the final product was indubitably his and
will remain an enduring tribute to his memory.°
I personally believe that the hypothesis concerning the U.C.C.
posited earlier in this article" should be rejected. For Karl Llewellyn
was far too honest and idealistic to continue supporting legislation
which was completely contrary to his own ideals and legal values., At
the very least, in view of the great wisdom of its Chief Reporter and
to Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71 Yale L.J. 813, 814-15 (1962).
el See pp. 142-43 supra.
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the nature of his legal philosophy, the U.C.C. should be minutely
scrutinized before it is rejected as an unfair, unbalanced piece of
legislation. In conducting this scrutiny and in applying the Code,
scholars, advocates and judges should always be mindful of the
"Grand Style" common law legal tradition which Karl Llewellyn
trusted and loved.
II. U.C.C. SECTION 1-205 AS A GENERAL, AFFIRMATIVE,
REASONABLENESS PROVISION" AND AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR
THE APPLICATION OF CONSUMER-DEVELOPED USAGES OF TRADE
A general and basic functional analysis does indeed bring
light to the phenomenon of modern official Law, reminding
us, for instance, that the more articulately elaborate the
recorded machinery of The Law gets to be, the more essen-
tial to health of the system is the careful provision, as part
of the system, of a penumbra of those legally recognizable,
but not yet clearly "recognized" lines of formation which I
have called the "jurid"; and reminding us that if we try (as
we do) to provide such a penumbra by way of a dozen differ-
ent make-shift and quite uncoordinated devices (from admis-
sion of usage in commercial cases on up) we shall then find
it working 'only sometimes and missing often enough when
it is most needed."
A. The Limited Utility of Currently Recognized Code "Flexibility
Provisions"
The sections of the Code which most reflect the flexible, case-
method philosophy of Karl Llewellyn are the provisions relating to
good faith," reasonableness," unconscionability," modification of the
Code by agreement," and the recognition of usage of trade and cus-
tom." These provisions, however, are not of equal utility in encour-
aging flexible interpretation of the Code, nor have they been con-
sistently utilized by the courts. The change in the general definition
of "good faith" from "honesty in fact" combined with "reasonable
62 See Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Rode: An Essay on the
Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law, 11 VW. L. Rev. 213, 250-53 (1966) [here-
inafter cited as Mooney) for a general suggestion of using § 1-205 of the U.C.C. as a
reasonableness provision.
63 Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic
Method, 49 Yale L.J. 1353, 1378-379 (1940).
64 See the Code provisions cited in note 54 supra.
60 See, e.g., U.C.C. { 1-102(3) ; Mooney, supra note 62.
80 U.C.C. § 2-302.
67 U.C.C. 11 2-102(3).
69 U.C.C. If 1-102(2) (h), -201(3), -205, 2-202(a), -208(2), -301, Comment.
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commercial standards,"" to mere "honesty in fact,"" reduced the
effectiveness of good faith as a flexibility provision. However, some
courts have been ignoring this ostensibly subjective test of good faith,
and have applied an objective test." The definition of good faith
which applies to Article Two transactions involving merchants re-
quires "the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade."'" Thus, all consumer-merchant transactions
within the scope of Article Two are, circumscribed by the concept of
commercial reasonableness. As to reasonableness, the assertion that
section 1-102(3), which provides that "the obligations of good faith,
diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be
disclaimed by agreement . . ." (emphasis added), embodies an affir-
mative reasonableness provision seems unduly strained. This section
seems merely to provide that specific reasonableness sections of the
Code may not be eliminated by agreement, although they may be
somewhat modified by agreed definitions of what constitutes reason-
able action. Section 2-302 of the Code, however, thrives in the courts
as a case law flexibility provision in Article Two cases, and has re-
cently been applied in Article Nine transactions." The modification
by agreement provision in Code Section 1-102, while permitting some
flexibility, only compounds the apparent social imbalance created by
the Code, because it is usually the businessman or financier who is
aware of unfavorable Code provisions, who has professional advice,
who has time to contemplate the transaction, who has the superior
bargaining position and who will draft any formal or written agree-
ment. However, this section also authorizes broad legal effect to be
accorded to usages of trade."
B. Ghen v. Rich as an Example of Common. Law Flexibility
Resulting from Trade Usages
Once, in concert with a group of suffering law students, I had the
misfortune of teaching the first year course in property. However, one
highlight in this difficult time was the case of Ghen v. Rich." For those
who do not recall the case, the libellant, a Provincetown fisherman,
shot with a bomb lance and killed a fast-swimming, fin-back whale,
which immediately sank to the bottom of the sea. Three days later the
est U.C.C. 1-201(16) (May 1949 Draft).
70 U.C.C. 5 1-201(19).
71 See, e.g., Factors & Note Buyers, Inc. v. Green Lane, Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 43,
245 A.2d 223 (Super, Ct. 1968).
72 U.C.C. 5 2-103(1) (b).
72 Comment, Unconscionable Security Agreements: Application of Section 2-302 to
Article 9,11 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 128 (1969).
74 See discussion on pp. 158-59 infra.
78 8 F. 159 (D. Mass., 1881).
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whale was discovered on a beach and was sold at auction by the
finder to respondent. The libellant heard of these events and sued to
recover the value of the whale. The court held for the libellant on
the basis of a longstanding Cape Cod usage to the effect that "the
first iron holds the whale," contrary to the general common law rule
requiring continued possession for ownership of wild animals. Ghen v.
Rich is a wonderful case for illustrating the flexibility of the com-
mon law and the manner in which trade practice, usage, and 'commu-
nity values and standards become part of the legal system! Ghen v.
Rich thus indicates that community-developed usages of trade may
override common law legal rules in cases involving personal property
transactions.
C. A Suggested New Approach to the interpretation of U.C.C.
Section 1-205
A man attempting to push through socially balanced commercial
legislation in the 1950's would realize that the strongest special-interest
pressure groups would be those representing business, commercial and
financial interests; that their attack would be highly sophisticated and
well organized; and that their efforts would be augmented by sub-
stantial legislative influence and power. He would, therefore, exert
great effort on behalf of the less-organized, politically ineffective con-
sumer and community interests. He would take full advantage of an
opportunity to compose the first draft of the Code, leaving it to the
special-interest groups to comb through it and attempt to cull out all
of the material which was objectionable to their interests. It would be
essential to provide a large number of obvious consumer and com-
munity protective provisions which could easily be found and stricken
out by the business, commercial and financial interest groups. In ad-
dition, less conspicuous consumer protection and social-balancing sec-
tions would be included which, hopefully, would survive the endless
negotiations, re-drafts, revisions, hearings, and legislative enactments
which were sure to come. Because the organized legal opposition was
principally occupied in dealing with narrow legal problems, Article
One, with its general rules and principles of construction, would appear
to be the best place to insert these subtle provisions, which would ulti-
mately provide and maintain the desired social balance.
What better place to "hide" a consumer-protection concept than
in a section which was highly desired by the business, commercial and
financial interests. Businessmen disliked previous commercial law
codifications because their rigidity inhibited and blocked development
of business practices and methods. They abhorred the development
of the commercial law in England where there is little connection
between the statutes and modern commercial methods and where most
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business transactions and disputes are handled outside the usual legal
structure, without regard to the content of the commercial statutes.
Business interests would, therefore, seize upon an opportunity to have
legal recognition accorded to changing trade usage and custom as a
basic provision in the general long-term commercial code. This would
be conducive to predictability and certainty of result to aid them in
business planning and analysis, but at the same time would not impede
the development of new business ideas, methods and procedures.
Ideally, businessmen desire complete flexibility in their own activ-
ities and complete certainty and predictability of the rights and duties
of the persons with whom they deal. But, by and large, businessmen
are realists and willing to accept reasonable solutions when the most
desirable result cannot be achieved. It may safely be assumed that one
central desire of businessmen is that they be reasonably able to predict
legal developments and that they be furnished sufficient time to adjust
to them. Section 1-205, therefore, appears to be an ideal instrument
for maintaining social balance in the Uniform Commercial Code." It
is a general Article One provision highly desired by the business, com-
mercial and financial interests; it involves "customary" law theories,
an area in which Karl N. Llewellyn was an expert but which is un-
familiar to most business-types; and it affords the sort of controlled
flexibility of legal development coupled with predictability of legal
Te U.C.C. II 1-205 provides:
(1) A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the
parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing
a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other
conduct.
(2) A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such
regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expecta-
tion that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question. The
existence and scope of such a usage are to be proved as facts. If it is established
that such a usage Is embodied in a written trade code or similar writing the In-
terpretation of the writing is for the court.
(3) A course of dealing between parties and any usage of trade in the voca-
tion or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or should be
aware give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an agree-
ment.
(4) The express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of dealing
or usage of trade shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each
other; but when such construction is unreasonable express terms control both
course of dealing and usage of trade and course of dealing controls usage of
trade.
(5) An applicable usage of trade in the place where any part of performance




(6). Evidence of a relevant usage of trade offered by one party is not ad-
missible unless and until he has given the other party such notice as the court
finds sufficient to prevent unfair surprise to the latter.
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change which was one of Llewellyn's principal goals for a legal system
which would conservatively accommodate itself to the changing values
of society.
My theory, then, is that section 1-205 encompasses commercial
practices and methods created and developed by consumers and the
community as well as businessmen. Thus, if certain consumer groups
or the "community" created or developed commercial patterns, either
complementing or conflicting with the Code, these patterns could, after
sufficient recognition for adequate commercial predictability, be ap-
plied by a court in a "trouble case."" The "community" in question
would include all persons in the relevant place, including persons en-
gaged in vocations and trades; however, it is the implicit premise of
this concept that, in some situations, the interests of the whole com-
munity will be in conflict with the special interests of a particular
trade or vocation."
This view of Code Section 1-205 derives considerable support
from the fact that other sections and comments stress the significance
of customary law in the interpretation and flexible development of the
Code. For example, section 1-102(2)(b) provides that one of the
underlying purposes and policies of the Code is "to permit the con-
tinued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and
agreement of the parties." Section 1-205 must be interpreted and con-
strued in accordance with this underlying purpose and policy. The use
of the word "custom" in section 1-102(2) (b) and its absence from
section 1-205 might suggest that the former section is broader in its
coverage than the latter, and that counsel advancing any customary
law theories should base their arguments on both sections. The New
York Law Revision Commission, which suggested most of the changes
made in section 1-205, felt that section 1-102(2) (b) had independent
significance beyond section 1-205 so far as statutory interpretation
is concerned." Notwithstanding the likelihood that this conclusion is
77 This view is consistent with Llewellyn's views on "juristic method." See Llewel-
lyn, The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic Method, 49
Yale L.J. 1355 (1940).
79 it is clear that usages of trade developed in particular trades and vocations are
admissible. See Levie, Trade Usage and Custom Under the Common Law and the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 40 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1106-109 (1965) ; Comment, Custom and
Trade Usage: Its Application to Commercial Dealings and the Common Law, 55 Colum.
L. Rev. 1192, 1206-208 (1955). Accordingly, this well-established principle will be men-
tioned only as necessary to assist in the analysis and evaluation of the suggestions set
forth in this article. There will also be no thorough consideration of the requirement
of notice of a trade or vocational usage to persons not engaged in the vocation or trade.
See in this connection, Franco v. Bank of Forest Park, 118 Ga. App. 700, 165 S.E.2d
593 (1968).
79 1 New York Law Revision Commission Reports 141 (1955).
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incorrect," it logically follows that the New York Law Revision Com-
mission viewed the two sections as co-extensive in the matter of con-
struction and interpretation of agreements. This deduction is not
expressly rejected by the New York Law Revision Commission and
precludes the possibility that the revised wording of section 1-205,
suggested by the Commission, was intended to incorporate into the
Code the rationale of the leading New York case of Walls v. Bailey,"
which ascribes a narrow characterization to usage of trade and a broad
classification to custom. Furthermore, the purposes and policy set forth
in section 1-102(2) and the broad language of section 1-205" tend to
negate such an interpretation. Even if usage of trade as defined in sec-
tion 1-205 were to be narrowly construed, section 1-102 (2) (b) should
authorize the introduction of a broad scope of custom, including cus-
tom created and developed by consumers and the community. The
elimination of consumer frustration and loss of confidence resulting
from defective products, excessive prices or interest, and deceptive
trade practices would inescapably lead to "commercial expansion."
Since the word "custom" is not defined by the Code, it is submitted that
in giving meaning to the term we should refer to the legal philosophy
of Karl Llewellyn, consider the nature of customary law, and look at
common law cases discussing custom. I would urge that the word cus-
tom suggests flexibility, reasonableness and a constant pressure upon
the law to adapt to the ever-changing values of society."
Customary commercial law is also recognized by Section 1-103
of the Code which includes the "law merchant" in its recitation of
relevant external principles. Section 1-103 further provides that com-
mon law principles apply unless displaced by particular provisions of
the Code. In addition to supporting the position that the provisions of
the Code are similar to common law principles, this reference in the
Code to the common law is relevant to the suggestions made in this
article in two other ways. First, if it should be decided that the lan-
guage of section 1-205 should be narrowly construed in accordance
with the definitions of usage of trade appearing in pre-Code case law,
then it might successfully be argued that the legislature in enacting
section 1-205 merely intended to codify the common law rules which
existed at that point in time, and that future developments in the area
of trade usage should parallel the development of non-statutory com-
mon law rules." Secondly, if a particular usage of trade is declared by
so See discussion on pp. 160-65 infra.
81 49 N.Y. 464 (1872), discussed on p. 164 infra.
82 See text of § 1-205 excerpted in note 76 supra.
Ea The need for an "interaction element" in customary law is discussed on pp. 161-65
infra.
84 See discussion on pp. 146-48 supra.
159
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
the courts to be unreasonable, a "rule vacuum" would result which
could be filled by the application of common law principles."'
Section 1-205 has been amended only once since the final draft
of the Code was promulgated. The revisions reportedly followed the
recommendations of the New York Law Revision Commission "for
clarification," and former subsection (3) was eliminated because of an
objection by the American Bankers Association." "Usage of trade" is
defined in the current section 1-205 (2) as follows:
A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having
such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade
as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with
respect to the transaction in question. The existence and
scope of such a usage are to be proved as facts. If it is estab-
lished that such a usage is embodied in a written trade code
or similar writing the interpretation of the writing is for the
court. (Emphasis added.)
Moreover, subsection (3) of present section 1-205 indicates that "any
usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged or
of which [the parties] are or should be aware" may be utilized in ,
interpreting an agreement. (Emphasis added.) The original draft of
section 1-205(2) provided:
A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing cur-
rently recognized as established in a particular place or among
those engaged in trade or in a particular vocation or trade. Its
existence and scope are questions of fact."
The original subsection (3) was not substantially different from the
present version on the issue of what constitutes a usage of trade."
The most difficult aspect of supporting the theory that section
1-205 encompasses consumer- or community-developed "usages of
trade," emerges upon analysis of the clause in section 1-205 which
requires of such a usage "such regularity of observance .. . as to
justify an expectation that it will be observed . . . ." The difficulty
presented in reconciling this clause with the above theory is suggested
by the following recommendation of the New York Law Revision Com-
mission which proposed the present wording of the clause:
It was recommended that the first sentence of subsection (2)
88 See discussion on pp. 121-73 infra. In addition to the Code provisions mentioned
above, a number of others embody a distinct "customary law" flavor. See, e.g., §1
2-202, -208(2), -301, Comment, -314(3), -316(3)(c).
86 I Wilier & Hart, supra note 12, § 1-205, at 1-41.87 U.C.C. 1-205(2) (May, 1949 Draft).
88 Id. § 1-205(3).
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be revised to embody the idea that a practice or method of
dealing, in order to qualify as usage of trade, must have
regular observance in practice (as distinguished from "recog-
nition" as a mental process) and that the kind and degree of
regularity of observance required are related to the question
whether expectations based on the assumption that it will be
observed are justified." (Emphasis added.)
Thus, those opposing the concept of consumer- or community-developed
usages of trade would argue that the substitution of "observed" for
"recognized" added a requirement of actual previous application.
Therefore, it would be argued that, in order to establish a usage of
trade, previous commercial transactions in which the 'usage was ap-
plied must be shown, and there would, of necessity, have to be at least
one businessman party to each of the previous transactions. There-
fore, it would be impossible for consumers or the community unilater-
ally to create and develop usages of trade, because they would be
unable to show actual application of the usage of trade in previous
commercial transactions.
The argument that the development of customary law requires
interaction is a strong one. Malinowski's famous example of a man
repeatedly walking across the village green at the same place and in
the same direction, as illustrating the manner in which customs de-
velop, is questionable because ordinarily customs evolve from relation-
ships between two or more persons. The behavior of a single individual
unrelated to another person ordinarily does not become a custom. This
recognition that societal relationships and patterns play a major role
both in the development of customs and in their ultimately acquiring
the status of legal principles is central to Llewellyn's philosophy of
law." However, the idea that customs may sometimes develop unilater-
ally should not be rejected. Trade-oriented customs and usages reg-
ularly applied in the community often become, to the full knowledge
of the businessman, less and less acceptable to the buyers and the
consumers. This dissatisfaction displays itself in many different ways
and ultimately precipitates a trouble case, as a result of which a new
pattern emerges. This process comports favorably with Llewellyn's
theory of the sociology of law,°1 and I believe it provides the requisite
element of "interaction" to give rise to a legitimate trade custom or
usage. Moreover, it must be remembered that the traditional usage of
trade was almost exclusively developed by the unilateral action of the
89 New York Law Revision Commission Reports 363-64 (1956).
00 see quotation on p. 147 supra.
91 See discussion on pp. 146-48 supra.
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businessman and then imposed upon consumers who had no under-
standing of the usage and did not participate in its creation.
The word "observed" does not of necessity include the require-
ment of previous application. It can reasonably be interpreted as re-
quiring merely some degree of "cognition." The New York Law
Revision Commission's explanation for the recommended change in
section 1-205 added the phrase "in practice,"" but this phrase does
not appear in the revised statutory language nor in the official com-
ments. The following comparison of the original and present wording
of comment 5 to section 1-205 illustrates this point:
ORIGINAL
A usage of trade under subsection
(2) must be "currently recognized
as established." The ancient Eng-
lish tests for "custom" are aban-
doned in this connection. There-
fore, it is not required that a usage
of trade be "ancient or imme-
morial," "universal" or the like.
Under the requirement of subsec-
tion (2) full recognition is thus
available for new usages and for
usages "currently recognized" by
the great majority of decent
dealers as "established," even
though dissidents ready to cut
corners do not agree. There is
room also for proper recognition
of usage agreed upon by mer-
chants in trade codes." (Emphasis
added.)
PRESENT
A usage of trade under subsection
(2) must have the "regularity of
observance" specified. The an-
cient English tests for "custom"
are abandoned in this connection.
Therefore, it is not required that
a usage of trade be "ancient or im-
memorial," "universal" or the like.
Under the requirement of subsec-
tion (2) full recognition is thus
available for new usages and for
usages currently observed by the
great majority of decent dealers,
even though dissidents ready to
cut corners do not agree. There
is room also for proper recogni-
tion of usage agreed upon by mer-
chants in trade codes." (Emphasis
added.)
It must be remembered that although the present language in
section 1-205, calling for "regularity of observance," originated with
the New York Law Revision Commission, that Commission did not
draft the Code, and the reasons for their recommendations did not
become part of the official comments. It is the language of the Code
itself, and not the intent of the New York Law Revision Commission,
which controls. The actual draftsmen of the revisions to Section 1205
of the Code were the Editorial Board of the Commissioners on Uni-
92 New York Law Revision Commission Reports 364 (1956).
93 U.C.C. 1-205, Comment 5 (Official Draft 1952).
94 U.C.C. § 1-205, Comment 5.
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form State Laws and, as noted earlier, their legislative intent in re-
wording the section was "clarification."" Official comment 5 to the
revised section was also reworded and where, as here, the official com-
ments are modified in conjunction with revisions to the text, the
comments should be given particular preference in statutory interpre-
tation. Although the present official comments to section 1-205 do
not explain in detail what "regularity of observance" entails, neither
the term "in practice" nor any similar term imposing a requirement
of actual previous application is used. Quite the contrary, the com-
ments state that full recognition may be given to "new usages." This
immediately raises the question of how a usage could be "new" if it
has been previously applied. Note that the term "new" cannot be in-
terpreted as recent, because "new usages" is used in conjunction with
the language referring to usages "currently observed" by decent
dealers. A comparison of the original and present wording of the
official comments to section 1-205" suggests that "observed" means
"currently recognized as established." This would lead to the conclu-
sion that the term "observed" embodies the concepts of "cognition"
plus reasonable predictability of legal application. In this connection
it should be noted that the second reference to "observance" in sec-
tion 1-205(2) speaks of justifying "an expectation that (the usage of
trade] will be observed with respect to the transaction in question."
(Emphasis added.) "Observed" in this context seems to connote an
expectation that legal recognition will be given to the usage of trade.
If the word "observed" includes prior legal application, it would be
logically impossible to give effect to a usage not previously accorded
legal recognition—a patently absurd conclusion. However, use of the
term "observed" does embody some element of application, even
though only prospective in effect. The first reference to "regularity of
observance" is tied to the second provision that the observance be
such as to "justify an expectation" of application. Even the recom-
mendations of the New York Law Revision Commission, quoted
above," state that observance is "related to" expectancy, and the
following summary of previous New York law by the Commission
lends additional support to this position:
However, the New York cases do not give a very clear-
cut picture of what constitutes the "existence" of a usage, and
frequently content themselves by saying that its existence is
a question for the jury. Since usage, like prior course of deal-
ing, is evidence of a common consent and expectation of the
55 Wilier & Hart, supra note 12.
95 See the parallel comparison on p. 162 supra.
trr See excerpt on pp. 160-61 supra.
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parties, it would seem that the usage should have such reg-
ularity of observance as to constitute a part of the expecta-
tions of both parties." (Footnotes omitted.)
Furthermore, the Commission made reference to the leading New
York case of Walls v. Bailey99
 on the question of "regularity of ob-
servance." The court in that case distinguished custom from local
usage, a distinction which was not made in the Code,'" and then con-
sidered whether a local usage was so widely and clearly known as to
have become part of the common law, thus rendering irrelevant the
question of whether one party actually knew of the usage. The court
held that the existence, duration and other characteristics of a custom
or usage were to be determined by the jury, and that therefore it was
error to refuse a party the right to show whether he actually knew
about the usage. The direct question presented in the case, however,
involved expectancy of application of the usage and the need for notice
of its existence, not the frequency with which the usage had been
applied in previous transactions. Thus, the 1955 analysis of the Com-
mission, based upon Walls v. Bailey, emphasized expectancy, and ex-
pectancy may develop through a "mental process," without actual
prior application. Therefore, most of the analysis of even the New
York Law Revision Commission emphasizes congnition plus commer-
cial predictability.
Furthermore, as indicated earlier, the revisions to section 1-205
were reportedly for purposes of "clarification" and were not intended
to effect major substantive changes. Finally, the language of com-
ment 5 virtually compels a cognition-plus-predictability-of-application
approach. The language of the revised clause retains a "Llewellyn-
like" quality, calling for a flexible, predictable development of usages
of trade. Giving a broad customary law treatment to the clause, in-
stead of treating it as a provision solely for the benefit of business,
commercial and financial interests, is completely in accord with the
underlying purpose and policy of the Code to encourage commercial
expansion through custom and usage."' As noted earlier, a business
climate which fulfills the legitimate expectations of consumers as well
as merchants can only encourage "commercial expansion." This anal-
ysis supports the conclusion that the "justify an expectation" clause
of Code Section 1-205 adds a certainty and predictability factor to
practices which have already been defined as trade usages. However,
98 1 New York Law Revision Commission Reports 322 (1955).
00 49 N.Y. 464 (1872).
100 The Commission recognized this fact. See 1 New York Law Revision Com-
mission Reports 323 (1955).
101 U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b).
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since the extant definitions of usage of trade are rather vague, the
operative tests in determining what constitutes a usage of trade may
ultimately focus .upon party awareness,'" commercial predictability,
certainty and expectancy.'"
On this point, it should be noted that the last sentence of com-
ment 5, regarding trade codes, calls into question the necessity of prior
application as well as the requirement of "interaction" between the
mercantile and consumer sectors for the development of new trade
usages, because it at least implies that new trade rules may immedi-
ately become usages upon their inclusion in a code and may be given
legal recognition in a case involving a non-assenting party. This is
not to suggest, however, that a consumer group may promulgate a
rule, give it wide publicity, and then have the rule applied as a usage
of trade by a court. The consumer group should first be required to
show that, as a result of a rule applied in numerous commercial trans-
actions, widespread discontent has developed, and that the obvious
means of correcting the unacceptable rule has become basically defined
and widely acknowledged. The new usage should be reasonable and
accepted by the community as being just. Nevertheless, counsel at-
tempting to establish a usage of trade should place substantial em-
phasis in his preparation upon the "expectancy of application" of the
new usage.
The revised section 1-205(2) adds the provision that if "such
a usage is embodied in a written trade code or similar writing the inter-
pretation of the writing is for the court." This language suggests that
there may be both usages and non-usages contained in trade codes.
Accordingly, rules contained in trade codes would have to meet the
other requirements of section 1-205(2) for usages in order to be given
effect as such. However, comment 5, which states that full recognition
will be given to "new usages," also states that "there is room also for
proper recognition of usage agreed upon by merchants in trade codes."
Arguably then, new rules agreed upon by merchants may be usages.
But what of the non-usages embodied in trade codes? In accordance
with the interpretation of section 1-205 suggested in this discussion,
these will be the rules which are not reasonable, which have not been
widely recognized and which have not attained sufficient predictability
of application to be given effect. The "trade code" provision of com-
ment 5, therefore, supports the thesis advanced in this article.
The phrase "similar writings," as used in section 1-205(2) sug-
gests something broader than a trade code, and raises the possibility
102 See U.C.C. § 1-205(3).
103 This apparently was the pre-Code situation in New York. See discussion on
p. 164 supra.
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that a consumer lawyer might introduce, in support of a proffered
new usage of trade, industry guides, advisory opinions, trade regula-
tion rules or deceptive trade practice regulations embodied in "writ-
ings" issued by the Federal Trade Commission, or by state or local
consumer protection agencies. Such trade regulation rules are much
akin to trade codes, since businessmen do participate in their prep-
aration. These writings would, of course, have to meet the other re-
quirements for a usage, and the "agreed upon by merchants" language
of comment 5 would arguably have to be limited to trade codes. While
this may be a difficult argument to sell to a court, the importance of
obtaining private sanctions for FTC deceptive trade practice regula-
tions makes it worth the attempt. I, therefore, suggest that the trade
code clause of section 1-205(2) presents two consumer law possibil-
ities, to wit:
1. Consumer groups should work with legitimate mer-
chant groups in the drafting and publicizing of "just" trade
codes. Such codes could be used pursuant to a reasonable in-
terpretation of section 1-205 to curb the dishonest practices
of corner-cutting merchants.
2. Consumer advocates should contend that Federal
Trade Commission industry guides, advisory opinions, trade
regulation rules and deceptive trade practice rules and regula-
tions are "similar writings" embodying trade usages which
should be given effect by the courts.
None of the other revisions to Code Section 1-205 are inconsistent
with these possibilities. The deletion of the language "among those
engaged in trade" from revised section 1-205(2) should not be taken
as an indication that businessmen of different trades and vocations
cannot together develop a usage of trade. The language change to the
effect that usages of trade may be developed in a "place, vocation or
trade" appears to be merely a stylistic change, for if a usage actually
may be developed in a "place," all of the businessmen in a given locale
could band together and develop a usage of trade. Such strict lin-
guistic constructions of the U.C.C. should be avoided in view of the
loose drafting employed in the original Code and subsequent careless-
ness in integrating revisions. The possibility that this language change
was intended to narrow the scope of usage of trade by eliminating the
concept of "custom" has already been rejected."'
A tangential matter arising out of the necessity that usages, other
than those embodied in trade codes and similar writings, must be
proved as facts should be mentioned. Since the existence of the usage
104 See discussion on pp. 158-59 supra.
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is a question of fact, no matter how often the existence of a particular
usage has been demonstrated in the past, it must be proved anew in
every subsequent case. The usage does not become law by way of
stare decisis, and it may even be that a court should not be able to
take judicial notice of a frequently proven usage of trade. This posi-
tion is supported by the change of the applicable language of the orig-
inal draft of section 1-205(2), which characterized questions of the
existence and scope of usages as "questions of fact," to the present
wording, which requires existence and scope "to be proved as facts."'"
Although this requirement of continuous proof of a proffered trade
usage might be viewed as placing an undue burden upon already over-
worked and overcrowded courts, it should be remembered that the very
purpose of recognizing usages is to permit commercial flexibility. Usages
may change rapidly in a dynamic economy, and it would be most un-
desirable to "freeze" the legal status of any particular usage of trade.
Moreover, allowing a court to take judicial notice of the "fact" of a
usage of trade from other cases involving different parties would raise
complicated and disturbing questions analogous to the arcane intrica-
cies of collateral estoppel.
D. The Connotation of the Terms "Place," "Practice," "Method"
and "Dealing" in Section 1-205
The Code does not define the words "place," "practice," "method"
or "dealing." These terms must be read in light of the context of sec-
tion 1-205, the fundamental objectives of the Code, the explanatory
material contained in its official comments, its legislative history, the
legal philosophy of its Chief Reporter, the current values of society
in the "place" in question, common law doctrines, and the particular
fact situation presented. Basically, these words are typical of the tra-
ditional, imprecise terms of the common law, whose principal purpose
was to activate and impart guidance to the processes of the common
law system. I suggest that each of these terms has three separate, but
related contents: (1) a law or rule content, (2) a fact content, and
(3) a justice content. It is the function of the courts to define, deline-
ate and balance the content of these words and, thus, to use their in-
105 This was not the specific purpose of the change as declared by the New York
Law Revision Commission:
It was suggested that the second sentence of subsection (2) is not precisely
accurate as a statement of present law, since it suggests that the determination is
always to be made by the jury in a case tried by jury. It was suggested that the
subsection should recognize as a question for the court the interpretation of a
written trade code or similar writing.
New York Law Revision Commission Reports 364 (1956). The Commission's 1955 re-
port suggests that a New York court could take judicial notice of a trade usage. See 1
New York Law Revision Commission Reports 329 (1955).
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herent ambiguity as a means of flexibly adapting the law to changes
in the values of society.
1. The Connotation of "Place"
At no point in section 1-205, nor in the comments thereto, is there
any limitation placed upon the persons or groups of persons who may
develop, promulgate or create a trade usage. The section does not
suggest or even imply that only professionals or persons directly en-
gaged in a vocation or trade may develop a usage of trade. A usage
may be developed in a place as well as in a vocation or trade. Section
1-205(5)'" is merely an interpretational provision and may not logic-
ally be applied to limit the conclusion that usages develop in places as
well as in vocations and trades. This section may even be used to sug-
gest that usages developed at a place have interpretational preference
over usages developed within vocations and trades. This position is
also supported by section 1-205 (3), which states that usages shall be
given the prescribed effect if the party was, or should have been, aware
of them. The argument that this applies only to usages developed by
other vocations and trades is unsound, since this restriction could
easily have been included in the section, and also because such an in-
terpretation would conflict with the "place" provision of section
1-205(2) and with a number of specific statements in the official com-
ments. Comment 4 to section 1-205 provides in pertinent part:
The language used is to be interpreted as meaning what it
may fairly be expected to mean to parties involved in the
particular commercial transaction in a given locality. . . .
(Emphasis added.)
Comment 7 to U.C.C. Section 1-205 states that a usage "may be either
general to trade or particular to a special branch of trade." (Emphasis
added.) These statements provide strong support for the position that
community usages, after they have developed sufficient recognition
and predictability, may acquire the status of general usages, applica-
ble to all conduct of business in a given place. The geographical limits
of the "place" in a given situation may present an extremely compli-
cated question of fact, but this sort of fact finding is the "heart and
life" of the common law system. The size of the "place" may vary
from issue to issue in a single case. For example, if the usage involved
pricing policies in a ghetto situation, it might be found that the
"place" was exclusively the ghetto area; however, if the usage in-
loe U.C.C. § 1-205(5) provides:
An applicable usage of trade in the place where any part of performance is to
occur shall be used in interpreting the agreement as to that part of the per-
formance.
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volved adequacy of disclosure or explanation, deceptive trade prac-
tices, general notions of fairness or similar questions, no reasonable
argument could be made that "place" should be so narrowly circum-
scribed. This would also be true because the economic requirements
of the ghetto businessman are arguably quite different from those of
the general merchandiser. On the other hand, the disparity in business
sophistication between the ghetto merchant and his customer as com-
pared to the general merchandiser and his customer will, in all prob-
ability, be considerably greater, thus requiring the application of at
least equal, if not greater, standards of fairness, reasonableness, dis-
closure and explanation.
2. The Connotation of "Practice"
The term "practice" contains a definite customary law flavor.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "practice" as "[r]epeated or custom-
ary action; habitual performance; a succession of acts of similar
kind; habit; custom; usage; . . . the exercise of any profession."wr
This definition is certainly broad enough to support the proposition
that consumers and the general community could, indeed, develop
"practices." Such an interpretation is consistent with the remainder of
the section and the whole Code. The problem with the word "prac-
tice" is that it may be found to contain some requirement of actual
prior application. As noted earlier, this prior application may well be
found in prior commercial transactions, in which an emerging pattern
of commercial behavior, characterized by friction, dissatisfaction and
discontent on the part of consumers, became sufficiently defined as to
be recognized as a usage of trade. Certainly the word "practice" is
not a precise legal word, and it affords substantial interpretational lati-
tude to a common law court.
3. The Connotation of "Method"
Although a rather mechanical meaning could be ascribed to the
term "method,'" the context of section 1-205 would seem to require
that this word be viewed as connoting the broad, general methods of
conducting business operations and of obtaining commercial objectives.
Used in conjunction with the term "practice," "method" could be in-
terpreted as covering basic business theory, as opposed to prior prac-
tical application. The principal obstacle to developing broad, flexible
definitions of these terms will be the predictable tendency of courts to
limit recognition of usages to fact situations paralleling those in pre-
Code usage cases, and consumer- or community-developed usages will
101 Black's Law Dictionary 1335 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
DS See, e.g., Id. at 1142.
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seem to be entirely different. Furthermore, most courts will, in all like-
lihood, have definite preconceived notions about what constitutes a
usage. Hopefully, emphasis upon the justice of the particular case,
the common law tradition, the underlying purposes and policies of the
Code, and thorough analysis of section 1-205 and its accompanying
comments will overcome these obstacles.
4. The Connotation of "Dealing"
"Dealing" suggests a content broader than trading. A "deal" has
been defined as "an arrangement to attain a desired result by a com-
bination of interested parties. ..."° (Emphasis added.) The interested
parties in a consumer sales transaction are the manufacturer, whole-
saler, retailer, financing agency, the purchaser and his family or other
consumers or persons exposed to the goods, and the community. "Deal-
ing" would thus seem to include an element of reasonableness.
5. Basic Elements Common to All of These Terms
All of these terms, consistent with the underlying purposes of the
Code, contain the following elements:
1. Common law flexibility;
2. Broad-scope relevance permitting the examination of a
transaction in its total socio-economic setting; and
3. Reasonableness.
While the first of these, common law flexibility, has been discussed in
some detail, the latter two elements deserve additional mention. A
broad-scope relevance approach is suggested by the comments to
section 1-205, which employ such phrases as "surrounding circum-
stances,""° "commercial context,' "commercial meaning,"'" "fur-
nish the background"'" and "the framework of common understand-
ing."'" The relevancy of the "commercial setting" is recognized in the
unconscionability section,"° and "other circumstances" may be con-
sidered under the Code's definition of "agreement.'""
If a case in which a trade usage is urged involves a merchant, as
it must, and is within the scope of Article Two of the Code,'" the
103 Id. at 487.
110 U.C.C. li 1-205, Comment 1.
111 Id.
112 U.C.C. § 1-20S, Comment 4.
113 Id.
114 Id.
Hs U.C.C. i 2-302(2).
110 U.C.C. § 1-201(3). Comment 3 to this section also speaks in terms of the "sur-
rounding circumstances."
117 The scope of Article 2 is delimited in U.C.C. § 2-102.
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whole transaction will be circumscribed by "the observance of rea-
sonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."' A court
might also imply a "reasonableness" requirement in a usage case in-
volving other articles of the Code." Section 1-205(2) provides that
the existence and scope of usage are to be proved as facts. One of the
favorite tricks in the common law is to classify an issue as a question
of fact in order to permit flexibility and justice in the individual case,
and then leave it to the jury to provide the "justice" ingredient. Treat-
ing usage as a question of fact buttresses the reasonableness content of
usages of trade and should assist consumer lawyers because of the
increased likelihood that juries will be a receptive audience for their
contentions. Moreover, judges should be hesitant to take the issue of
existence of the usage away from the jury, and, in doubtful cases,
should always submit the issue to the jury on proper instructions. The
comments to section 1-205 also support the reasonableness ingredient
both in their specific language' and in their general customary law
tone.
E. The "Affirmative Reasonableness" Aspect of Section 1-205
Reasonableness has both a negative and affirmative aspect with
respect to usages of trade, that is, unreasonable usages will not be recog-
nized and reasonable usages will be recognized. The negative aspect
is spelled out in comment 6 to section 1-205. 121
 In addition, by defini-
tion, the term "agreement" includes applicable usages, 122
 and agree-
ments governed by Article Two are limited by the unconscionability
section. 123 As indicated above, agreements beyond the scope of Article
118 U.C.C. § 2-103(1) (b).
110 See U.C.C. § 1-204 which establishes a flexible concept of "reasonable time" for
actions by the parties to a transaction.
12° U.C.C. § 1-205, Comment 6.
121 U.C.C. I 1-205, Comment 6 provides:
The policy of this Act controlling explicit unconscionable contracts and clauses
(Sections 1-203, 2-302) applies to implicit clauses which rest on usage of trade
and carries forward the policy underlying the ancient requirement that a custom
or usage must be "reasonable." However, the emphasis is shifted. The very fact
of commercial acceptance makes out a prima facie case that the usage is rea-
sonable, and the burden is no longer on the usage to establish itself as being
reasonable. But the anciently established policing of usage by the courts is con-
tinued to the extent necessary to cope with the situation arising if an uncon-
scionable or dishonest practice should become standard. (Emphasis added.)
122 U.C.C. § 1-201(3) provides:
"Agreement" means the bargain of the parties In fact as found in their language
or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage
of trade or course of performance as provided in this Act (Sections 1-205 and
2-208). Whether an agreement has legal consequences is determined by the pro-
visions of this Act, if applicable; otherwise by the law of contracts (Section
1-103).
128 U.C.C. § 2-302.
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Two may also be circumscribed by unconscionability or closely anal-
ogous common law doctrines relating to contracts of adhesion.'" It is
therefore clear that a usage of trade, no matter how clearly estab-
lished, will not be given effect if its application in the particular case
would be unreasonable. The dynamics of this process consist of the
following three phases:
1. Establishment of the usage of trade;
2. A change in community values making the usage unreason-
able; and
3. The usage ultimately being no longer recognized.
The concept of affirmative reasonableness is supported both by the
underlying policy of the Codel" and by the comments to section
1-205.1" It also follows as a logical consequence of recognizing the
concept of negative reasonableness. The dynamics of the process by
which an old usage is rejected as being unreasonable and a new, more
reasonable usage adopted in its place would be as follows:
1. Establishment of a usage of trade;
2. A change in community values making the usage unrea-
sonable;
3. The usage no longer being recognized;
4. A resulting rule vacuum; 12?
5. Application of the common law to fill the vacuum ; 128 and
6. Recognition of a new usage by the court, employing the
common law method in order to reach a just and reason-
able result in the particular case.'"
This sequence of development results in the affirmative reason-
ableness concept becoming a part of the common law. If this is possi-
ble, then the possibility of affirmative reasonableness being recognized
in the form of a usage of trade would also seem to follow. The first
three steps of the foregoing sequence seem, of necessity, to be part
of the process leading to the establishment of any new concept of rea-
sonableness. A new reasonable method of doing business always dis-
places an old business method, the latter, of necessity, becoming
unreasonable because it conflicts with the new reasonableness. There-
124 see generally Unconscionable Security Agreements: Application of Section 2-302
to Article 9, 11 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 128 (1969).
128 See U.C.C. 4 1-102(3).
128 U.C.C. I 1-205, Comment 6.
121 Assuming that this vacuum has not been filled by an express contractual term
under U.C.C. 1-205(4), and further assuming that no other specific U.C.C. provision
applies. See discussion on pp. 174-76 infra.
128 In accordance with U.C.C. I 1-103.
129 See U.C.C. 2-204(3).
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fore, the establishment of a new rule of commercial reasonableness
always includes the first three steps of the foregoing sequence, and
makes specific proof of their occurrence in each case unnecessary. I
have, therefore, concluded that section 1-205 may be interpreted as
containing both an affirmative and a negative reasonableness content.
If this conclusion is correct, section 1-205 may supply the general
reasonableness rule of construction which, at first blush, appears to be
missing from Article One.
F. The "Purpose-line" Theory and Section 1-205
Comment 9 to section 1-205, which has remained unchanged
since the final draft, is a valuable aid to interpretation of that section.
This comment provides:
In cases of a well established line of usage varying from
the general rules of this Act where the precise amount of the
variation has not been worked out into a single standard,
the party relying on the usage is entitled, in any event, to the
minimum variation demonstrated. The whole is not to be dis-
regarded because no particular line of detail has been estab-
lished. In case a dominant pattern has been fairly evidenced,
the party relying on the usage is entitled under this section
to go to the trier of fact on the question of whether such
dominant pattern has been incorporated into the agreement.
It does not require a great deal of acumen to deduce that this comment
is strikingly similar to what I have chosen to call Llewellyn's "pur-
pose-line theory."'" This comment thus indicates bow closely related
section 1-205 is to Karl Llewellyn's legal philosophy: it supports the
position that persons other than tradesmen and persons engaged in
vocations may create and develop usages of trade; it encourages a
broad-scope relevancy treatment of usage; it supports the refutation
of a distinction between custom and usage; it implies an affirmative
concept of reasonableness; and it suggests liberality and flexibility
in determining the observance necessary to justify an expectation of
application. Consumer groups which have undertaken to disseminate
information and to educate all members of the community on con-
sumer protection, may be able, with respect to many aspects of these
programs, to contend successfully that these aspects should be ac-
corded the legal recognition permitted by section 1-205. The vast
quantity of publicity concerning consumer protection emanating from
all levels of government provides a substantial basis for awareness,
130 See discussion on pp. 147-48 supra.
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expectancy of application and, accordingly, commercial predictability
of the effect of these writings.
Notwithstanding the revision of section 1-205, the section still
embodies the legal philosophy of Karl Llewellyn. This is indicated by
the presence of broad, direction-indicating fact-law terms; the heavy
reliance upon the courts to implement the "purpose-line theory;" the
inherent flexibility; the continuum of development from social recog-
nition to legal recognition in a manner permitting predictability and
expectation of application; and the basic concept of reasonableness.
It would therefore appear that a party may, upon giving the required
notice"' to the other party and offering sufficient evidence of the usage
to the trier of fact, establish a reasonable and community-accepted
usage of trade, created, established or developed by persons in the
community, whether engaged in a trade or vocation or not, provided
that the other party is or should be aware of the usage, so long as
the application of the usage is justifiably to be expected.
G. The Legal Effect of Usages of Trade
The legal effect to be given to a usage of trade, proved and estab-
lished in accordance with section 1-205, is outlined in the section itself.
Present section 1-205 provides in part:
[A]ny usage [s] of trade in the vocation or trade in which they
[the parties to a transaction] are engaged or of which they
are or should be aware give particular meaning to and sup-
plement or qualify terms of an agreement. (Emphasis added.)
The earlier version of section 1-205 provided:
(3) The parties to a contract are bound by any course of
dealing between them and by any usage of trade of which
both are or should be aware and parties engaged in a par-
ticular vocation or trade are bound by its usages.
(4) Unless contrary to a mandatory rule of this Act:
(a) A course of dealing or usage of trade gives par-
ticular meaning to and supplements or qualifies
terms of the agreement. 182
At first glande, these two provisions appear to be substantially different.
The original section provided that a recognized usage of trade would
be treated both as a binding rule of law and also as a rule of construe-
181 U.C.C. I 1-205(6) provides:
Evidence of a relevant usage of trade offered by one party is not admissible
unless and until he has given the other party such notice as the court finds suf-
ficient to prevent unfair surprise to the latter.
182
 U.C.C. II 1-205(3) and -205(4) (a) (May, 1949 Draft).
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tion or interpretation, while the current section provides that a recog-
nized usage of trade is effective only as a rule of construction or
interpretation. However, upon further analysis, it is apparent that
there is no real difference in the legal effect ascribed to usages of trade
by the two provisions, and that the present version is merely a better
drafted statement of the desired result. Comment 4 to the original
provision provided that a usage of trade could not abrogate a manda-
tory rule of law such as the Statute of Frauds,'" and it is most likely
that this interpretation would have been given to the original provision
if the issue had been raised. Thus, under the original section an estab-
lished usage of trade would have abrogated non-mandatory provisions
of the Code and would have supplemented, qualified or given par-
ticular meaning to the terms of the agreement. Under the current
section, "give particular meaning," "supplement" and "qualify" are
extremely broad terms which, by themselves, could be interpreted as
permitting usages to change non-mandatory provisions of the U.C.C.
In any event, the Code definition of "agreement," as indicated earlier,
includes usages of trade,' and U.C.C. Section 1-102(3) provides:
The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agree-
ment, except as otherwise provided in this Act and except
that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness
and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by
agreement.... (Emphasis added.)
There can be no doubt, therefore, that a usage of trade under the
Code as presently worded may be used to vary non-mandatory Code
provisions. The possibility of a situation in which usage would be urged
in a consumer transaction where there was no "agreement" seems too
remote for speculation. Given the fact that there is no distinction be-
tween a rule of law and a rule of construction in this situation and in
view of the awkwardness of having the mandatory rule proviso ap-
plicable only to sub-section (4) of the original draft, the result of the
amendment is a mere stylistic improvement providing more accurate
expression, notwithstanding the intentions of the "revisors."
"Give particular meaning," "supplement" and "qualify" are the
same sort of broad-scope, common law terms as are contained in
section 1-205(2) and are intended to be accorded particular meaning
in ever-changing circumstances through the processes of the common
law system. They each should be found to have a law, fact and justice
content. The comments to section 1-205 support this position. Corn-
Ds The Statute of Frauds provisions of the Code include I§ 1-206, 2.201, 8-319,
9-203(1) (b).
184 See the text of U.C.C. § 1-201(3) excerpted In note 122 supra.
175
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
ment 4 imparts a customary law flavor to the effect to be given a usage
of trade:
By adopting in this context the term "usage of trade" this
Act expresses its intent to reject those cases which see ev-
idence of "custom" as representing an effort to displace or
negate "established rules of law.'""
The broad effect to be given usage of trade is also expressed in com-
ment 5:
Under the requirement of subsection (2) full recognition is
thus available for new usages and for usages currently ob-
served by the great majority of decent dealers, even though
dissidents ready to cut corners do not agree.'" (Emphasis
added.)
Finally, the "purpose-line theory" embodied in comment 91" suggests
that effect should be given to a wide scope of usages, and that usages
may be recognized and applied if the "expectancy" requirement is
met, even though the precise scope and details of the usage are not
yet clearly defined.
H. Suggested Rules of Construction for Application in
Trade Usage Cases
In view, of the foregoing suggestions, the following rules of con-
struction are proposed for application in cases involving a proffered
trade custom or usage under section 1-205:
1. Full effect should be given to the underlying Code policy of
permitting continued expansion of commercial practices through cus-
tom and usage;
2. Substantial reliance should be placed upon the official com-
ments to the section;
3. The section should be construed as encompassing both affir-
mative and negative reasonableness;
4. The objectives of overall social balance and maximum social
adaptability for the Code should be promoted;
5. The just result in the particular case should, as nearly as
'possible, be attained; and
6. Doubtful questions of trade usage should be resolved in favor
of consumer and community interests and against the business, corn-
185 U.C.C. § 1-205, Comment 4.
188 U.C.C. I 1-205, Comment 5.
187 See U.C.C. 1-205, Comment 9.
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mercial and financial interests which exercised such disproportionate
pressure and influence during the evolution and enactment of the Code.
A possible limitation on the legal effect to be accorded a usage of trade
emerges from the rule of construction contained in U.C.C. Section
1-205(4):
The express terms of an agreement and an applicable course
of dealing or usage of trade shall be construed wherever
reasonable as consistent with each other; but when such con-
struction is unreasonable express terms control both course
of dealing and usage of trade and course of dealing controls
usage of trade.
If the parties, either expressly or by implication from their actions,
freely bargain to an agreement contrary to a usage of trade, that
agreement should control. A problem arises when the agreement pur-
ports to exclude all usages of trade. This type of general exclusionary
clause is a classic example of "lawyers' terms" which are not under-
stood by either party to the agreement and are not really a part of
the "bargain of the parties in fact."'" Such blanket exclusionary
clauses should be held to be unconscionable, since, without a clear
explanation, the average layman would have no comprehension what-
soever of the effect of such a clause on his rights. I think most busi-
nessmen would be hesitant to exclude all usages of trade in any event,
since usages are often beneficial to them. An attempt by a merchant
dealing with a non-merchant to exclude all usages of trade except those
applicable to his trade, would most likely also be stricken as uncon-
scionable. Even if the court should find that an exclusionary clause
were effective, usages of trade should still be admissible in order to
clear up any "ambiguities" in the agreement.'" According proper
treatment to rules of construction in delimiting the effect of general
exclusionary clauses is a familiar challenge to the common law art,
and I am confident that the challenge will be met by the courts in
such a way as to obtain just results in particular cases.
CONCLUSION
The critics, who have completely rejected the Code and rushed
to the legislatures, have acted precipitously. Remembering the great-
ness of Karl Llewellyn and of his legal philosophy, scholars, judges
and members of the practicing bar should carefully re-examine the
Code. Properly applied, the Code contains many common law expan-
188 See text of U.C.C. § 1-201(3) excerpted fn note 122 supra.
139 See U.C.C. 2-202.
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sion joints, and positive legal and societal results may be achieved by
litigating Code issues in the common law system. It has become ap-
parent that attempts to solve Code problems through additional legisla-
tion inevitably result in a plethora of piecemeal, ill-conceived statutes
which serve only to compound the problems they were intended to
resolve. A potential vehicle for Code flexibility and expansion in con-
sumer transactions is afforded by section 1-205, the usage of trade
provision. Consumer groups could use section 1-205 to great advantage
in at least five general ways:
1. As a general affirmative reasonableness provision applicable
to all Code transactions;
2. As a specific reasonableness provision, circumscribing and
limiting business usage and practice by requiring that all such usages
and practices be reasonable;
3. As a basis for urging the development of trade codes and
other usages of trade by honest businessmen in a given place, vocation
or trade, as a means of curbing their less ethical brethren;
4. As a basis for urging upon courts industry guides, advisory
opinions, trade regulation rules and defeptive trade practice regula-
tions issued by the Federal Trade Commission or other agencies as
"similar writings" embodying evidence of "usage of trade" under
section 1-205(2); and
5. As an incentive for consumer and community groups to de-
velop, publicize, and thus establish reasonable usages of trade which
would be of benefit to consumers.
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